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PATENT REFORM AND BEST MODE: A SIGNAL TO THE 
PATENT OFFICE OR A STEP TOWARD ELIMINATION? 
Ryan Vacca* 
ABSTRACT 
On September 16, 2011, President Obama signed the America 
Invents Act (―AIA‖) the first major overhaul of the patent system in 
nearly sixty years.  This article analyzes the recent change to patent 
law‘s best mode requirement under the AIA.  Before the AIA, patent 
applicants were required, at the time of submitting their 
application, to disclose the best mode of carrying out the invention 
as contemplated by the inventor.  A failure to disclose the best mode 
was a basis for a finding of invalidity of the relevant claims or could 
render the entire patent unenforceable under the doctrine of 
inequitable conduct.  The AIA still requires patent applicants to 
disclose the best mode but has removed the traditional enforcement 
mechanisms—declarations of invalidity and unenforceability—as 
defenses to patent infringement.  In this article, I propose and 
explore several innovative techniques that could be used to add 
teeth to the seemingly toothless best mode requirement.  
Ultimately, I reject these proposals as not being workable solutions 
and suggest that Congress‘s resolution of the best mode problem is 
nonsensical and that it should completely eliminate the 
requirement rather than send mixed signals to the Patent Office 
and patent practitioners. 
  
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law.  The author gratefully 
thanks Sarah Cravens and the participants at Akron‘s Fifth Annual IP Scholars Forum for 
their contributions. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The best mode requirement of patent law has been the proverbial 
redheaded stepchild with respect to disclosures.  Its sibling, 
enablement, is seen as the core component of the bargain between 
the inventor and the public.1  Without enablement, we would be 
thrust back into seventeenth century England, where state-
sanctioned monopolies were commonly granted at the expense of the 
public.2  But best mode has struggled to find its place.  Is it central 
to the goals of the patent system?  Is it uniquely American?  Does it 
benefit the public?  If so, is this benefit worth the costs?  These 
questions have plagued best mode for years.  With passage of the 
AIA,3 Congress has partially answered these lingering questions.  
But, by definition, when questions are only partially answered 
additional unanswered questions remain.  This article examines the 
AIA‘s changes to the best mode, evaluates what impact those 
 
1 See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA 
L. REV. 127, 167 (2008). 
2 Michael J. Madison, Beyond Invention: Patent as Knowledge Law, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 71, 79 (2011); see Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Ja1/21/3/contents; see also Mark D. Janis, On Courts 
Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly 
Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 55, 55 & n.4 (2000) (citation omitted) 
(highlighting enablement‘s genesis in the Statute of Monopolies). 
3 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
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changes will have and what problems or questions have been raised 
as a result, and then sets forth and assesses possible solutions. 
Part II reviews the early history of the best mode, its culmination 
in the 1952 Patent Act, and the critiques made to the 1952 Act‘s 
best mode requirement.  Part III discusses the AIA‘s best mode 
compromise, including the legislative history leading up to the AIA‘s 
enactment, and the potential concern resulting from this 
compromise—a lack of means of enforcement.  Part IV builds upon 
this concern by illustrating how enforcement of the best mode at the 
Patent and Trademark Office is nonexistent.  Part V describes how 
the AIA‘s best mode reform could be seen as a Congressional step 
towards complete elimination of best mode or an opportunity for the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (―PTO‖) to use 
innovative methods to enforce it.  Finally, Part V discusses the 
limitations of these innovative methods of enforcement and 
concludes that these methods are unlikely to be effective at 
encouraging best mode disclosures. 
II.  BEST MODE BEFORE THE AIA 
A.  Early History 
The origins of best mode stem back to the nation‘s first patent 
act—the Patent Act of 1790.4  Section 2 of the 1790 Act required the 
patentee to deliver a specification that was sufficiently particular: 
[N]ot only to distinguish the invention or discovery from 
other things before known and used, but also to enable a 
workman or other person skilled in the art or 
manufacture . . . to make, construct, or use the same, to the 
end that the public may have the full benefit thereof, after 
the expiration of the patent term.5 
Similarly, section 6 of the 1790 Act contained the ―whole of the 
truth‖ defense.6  This defense permitted an alleged infringer to 
prevail in the event the patentee‘s specifications either did not 
contain all of the information about the invention or contained more 
information than ―necessary to produce the effect described.‖7  
 
4 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed); Jerry R. Selinger, In Defense of “Best 
Mode”: Preserving the Benefit of the Bargain for the Public, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 1071, 1072 
(1994). 
5 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (emphasis added). 
6 Id. § 6, 1 Stat. at 111–12. 
7 Id. 
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Furthermore, this defense required either that the concealment or 
surplus information actually mislead the public so the described 
effect could not be produced by the means specified or that the 
patentee intended this to be so.8  Read together, these provisions of 
the 1790 Act imposed a requirement that patentees come forward 
with all of the relevant detail about their inventions and conceal 
nothing from the public, which would lead to full enjoyment of their 
inventions after the patents expired. 
Three years later, Congress repealed the 1790 Act and replaced it 
with the Patent Act of 1793.9  The 1793 Act required patentees to 
set forth a written description of their inventions ―in such full, clear 
and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things 
before known, and to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to 
make, compound, and use the same.‖10  This change continued to 
increase the chasm between enablement and what would become 
best mode.  Importantly, the 1793 Act also mandated that ―in the 
case of any machine, [the patentee] shall fully explain the principle, 
and the several modes in which he has contemplated the application 
of that principle or character, by which it may be distinguished from 
other inventions . . . .‖11 
The 1793 Act also modified the ―whole of the truth‖ defense.12  
Section 6 of the 1793 Act permitted an alleged infringer to assert 
the ―whole of the truth‖ defense and, if successful, would require the 
court to declare the patent void.13  To succeed, the alleged infringer 
only needed to prove that the specification did ―not contain the 
whole truth relative to [the patentee‘s] discovery, or that it 
contain[ed] more than [was] necessary to produce the described 
effect, which concealment or addition shall fully appear to have 
been made, for the purpose of deceiving the public.‖14  The 1793 Act 
removed the burden on the alleged infringer to show that the 
described effect could not be achieved through the specified means.15  
Thus, the focus on the ―whole of the truth‖ defense was now 
squarely focused on the patentee‘s intent to mislead the public.16 
 
8 See id. 
9 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318. 
10 Id. § 3, 1 Stat. at 321. 
11 Id. § 3, 1 Stat. at 321–22. 
12 Selinger, supra note 4, at 1074. 
13 Patent Act of 1793 § 6, 1 Stat at 322. 
14 Id. 
15 Selinger, supra note 4, at 1074. 
16 See id. 
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The Patent Act of 183617 largely left the enablement requirement 
unchanged, but it did modify the ―whole of the truth‖ defense to 
remove the consequence that the patent be declared void upon a 
successful assertion of the defense.18  One of the first cases to 
interpret the 1836 Act as calling for a best mode is Page v. Ferry.19  
In Page, the alleged infringer asserted that the patentee had 
withheld a description of the best mode of effectuating the patented 
machine.20  The court stated that ―[t]he patentee is bound to disclose 
in his specifications the best method of working his machine known 
to him at the time of his application.  An infringement will not have 
taken place, unless the invention can be practiced completely by 
following the specifications.‖21  The court in Page continued on to 
explain that ―[t]he specification is intended to teach the public the 
improvement patented; it must fully disclose the secret; must give 
the best mode known to the inventor, and contain nothing defective, 
or that would mislead artists of competent skill in the particular 
manufacture.‖22  The court‘s discussion of the best mode was 
distinct from its earlier discussion regarding enablement.23  The 
best mode requirement had now developed a life of its own, 
although not yet codified in the Patent Act.24 
Although recognized in Page v. Ferry, the Patent Act of 187025 
was the first time the phrase ―best mode‖ was used in patent 
legislation.26  In particular, section 26 of the 1870 Act required the 
applicant, in the case of a patent for a machine, to ―explain the 
principle hereof, and the best mode in which he has contemplated 
applying that principle so as to distinguish it from other 
inventions.‖27  Of course, the main restriction of this best mode 
requirement was that it only applied to patent applications 
 
17 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 117–25. 
18 Selinger, supra note 4, at 1075. 
19 Page v. Ferry, 18 F. Cas. 979 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1857) (No. 10,662). 
20 Id. at 984. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 See id. at 983; see also Selinger, supra note 4, at 1079 (explaining that in Page the court 
charged the jury separately on best mode and enablement). 
24 But see Sewall v. Jones, 91 U.S. 171, 185–86 (1875) (analyzing novelty, but stating ―[t]he 
omission to mention in the specification something which contributes only to the degree of 
benefit, providing the apparatus would work beneficially and be worth adopting without it, is 
not fatal, while the omission of what is known to be necessary to the enjoyment of the 
invention is fatal.‖). 
25 Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198. 
26 Id. § 26, 16 Stat. at 201; see also 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.05 
(Matthew Bender 2010). 
27 Patent Act of 1870 § 26, 16 Stat. at 201. 
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regarding machines.28  Interestingly, the 1870 Act preserved the 
―whole of the truth‖ defense, which had served as the basis for a 
separate best mode requirement until 1870.29 
B.  The 1952 Patent Act 
In 1952, Congress again amended the Patent Act30 and codified 
best mode in section 112.  The relevant portion of section 112 states: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and 
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to 
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or 
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the 
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the 
inventor of carrying out his invention.31 
Importantly, best mode was now required for all inventions, not 
just machines.32  Also codified was that failure of the inventor to 
comply with any of the requirements of section 112, including best 
mode, would be a basis for invalidity.33  Missing from the 1952 Act 
was the ―whole of the truth‖ defense.34 
Initially, courts tended to analyze enablement and best mode 
together rather than consider them as distinct requirements.35  
However, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (―CCPA‖) soon 
clarified that the two requirements were different.  In In re Gay,36 
the CCPA explained the two requirements as follows: 
 The essence of [the enablement requirement] is that a 
specification shall disclose an invention in such a manner as 
will enable one skilled in the art to make and utilize it.  
Separate and distinct from [enablement] is [the best mode 
requirement], the essence of which requires an inventor to 
disclose the best mode contemplated by him, as of the time he 
executes the application, of carrying out his invention.  
 
28 Id. 
29 Id. § 61. 
30 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792. 
31 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010) (emphasis added). 
32 See In re Honn, 364 F.2d 454, 461 n.7 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (―[T]he requirement for disclosing 
the best mode of carrying out the invention is stated as generally applicable to all types of 
invention.‖); Selinger, supra note 4, at 1080–81. 
33 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2010). 
34 3 CHISUM, supra note 26, § 7.05. 
35 See, e.g., Zoomar, Inc. v. Paillard Prods., Inc., 152 F. Supp. 328, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); 
Lamm v. Watson, 138 F. Supp. 219, 220 (D.D.C. 1955). 
36 In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
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Manifestly, the sole purpose of this latter requirement is to 
restrain inventors from applying for patents while at the 
same time concealing from the public preferred embodiments 
of their inventions which they have in fact conceived.   
 . . .  The question of whether an inventor has or has not 
disclosed what he feels is his best mode is, however, a 
question separate and distinct from the question of the 
sufficiency of his disclosure to satisfy the requirements of 
[enablement].37 
Later, the Federal Circuit, echoing the CCPA‘s explanation in In 
re Gay, explained: 
Enablement looks to placing the subject matter of the claims 
generally in the possession of the public.  If, however, the 
applicant develops specific instrumentalities or techniques 
which are recognized at the time of filing as the best way of 
carrying out the invention, then the best mode requirement 
imposes an obligation to disclose that information to the 
public as well.38 
The policy rationale underlying best mode is based on the quid 
pro quo basis of patent law.39  The Federal Circuit has described the 
purpose of best mode as requiring ―that [the] patent applicant play[ 
] ‗fair and square‘ with the patent system,‖40 meaning that the 
patentee should not receive from the public the right to exclude 
―while at the same time concealing from [it the] preferred 
embodiments of the[] invention.‖41  In other words, the patentee 
should not be able to obtain the benefits of a patent while 
maintaining part of the invention as a trade secret—the antithesis 
of a patent.  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
articulated a variation of this policy rationale—to create a level 
playing field so the public (via competitors) can compete fairly after 
the patent expires.42 
As noted, under earlier patent acts, failure to satisfy the best 
mode was a basis for refusing to grant a patent and could also be 
asserted as a defense to infringement and as a basis for a finding of 
invalidity.43  The 1952 Patent Act carried this forward; section 282 
 
37 Id. at 772. 
38 Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
39 3 CHISUM, supra note 26, § 7.05[1][a]. 
40 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1209–10 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
41 Wahl Instruments, Inc. v. Acvious, Inc., 950 F.2d 1575, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
42 See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 870 F.2d 1292, 1302 n.8 (7th Cir. 1989). 
43 See supra Part II.A. 
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provided for invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure 
to comply with any requirement of section 112.44  Although distinct 
from invalidity, failure to satisfy the best mode also served as a 
basis for inequitable conduct, which would render the patent 
unenforceable.45 
To determine whether best mode has been complied with, the 
Federal Circuit established a two-prong inquiry.46  The first part is 
a subjective inquiry.47  It must be determined whether the inventor, 
at the time the patent application was filed, ―knew of a mode of 
practicing [the] claimed invention that [the inventor] considered to 
be better than any other.‖48  If the first prong is satisfied, then the 
second prong is considered.49  The second prong is objective.50  This 
prong asks whether what the inventor knew under the first prong 
was adequately disclosed so as ―to enable one skilled in the art to 
practice the [best] mode.‖51 
Over the last couple of decades, issues regarding interpretation of 
the best mode have arisen and the courts (primarily the Federal 
Circuit) have been called upon to clarify (sometimes unsuccessfully) 
these issues.52  One early question that arose was whether an 
employer, who was the assignee of the patent, would have its 
knowledge of a preferred embodiment imputed to the 
employee/inventor and therefore violate the best mode if this 
preferred embodiment was not adequately disclosed.53  The Federal 
Circuit rejected the imputation theory, holding that ―[t]he statutory 
language [of section 112] could not be clearer‖ and that what must 
be disclosed is the best mode contemplated by the inventor.54 
A second issue involving best mode concerned whether the 
 
44 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2010). 
45 See Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 1321–22 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (holding that intentionally concealing the mode used to make the invention may 
provide a basis for finding inequitable conduct). 
46 3 CHISUM, supra note 26, at § 7.05[1]; Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 
923, 927–28 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
47 Chemcast, 913 F.2d at 928. 
48 Id. at 928. 
49 See id. 
50 Id. (―Assessing the adequacy of the disclosure, as opposed to its necessity, is largely an 
objective inquiry that depends upon the scope of the claimed invention and the level of skill in 
the art.‖). 
51 Id. 
52 See Matthew H. Solomson, Patently Confusing: The Federal Circuit’s Inconsistent 
Treatment of Claim Scope as a Limit on the Best Mode Disclosure Requirement, 45 IDEA 383, 
387 (2005). 
53 Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
54 Id. 
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applicant was required to specifically signify which mode of the 
several listed is the best.55  In Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., the 
Federal Circuit held that the indiscriminate disclosure of the best 
mode along with other possible modes satisfied the best mode 
requirement.56 
A third issue that arose concerned the scope of the best mode.57  
In other words, is best mode limited to the elements listed in the 
claims or does it require the inventor to disclose the best mode 
relating to unclaimed elements of the invention?58  Although 
addressing it frequently, the Federal Circuit has failed to answer 
this question with any certainty and the question still lingers 
today.59 
In sum, based on the statutory language of section 112 and courts‘ 
interpretations of it, it is clear that best mode comprises a 
subjective and objective inquiry, must be examined at the time the 
patent application is filed rather than when the patent is issued, is 
solely examined from the perspective of the inventor, and does not 
have to be specifically labeled in the patent application.60  However, 
much confusion still exists regarding the scope of the best mode. 
C.  Critiques of Best Mode 
In addition to some of the confusion surrounding its 
requirements, best mode has come under attack as a matter of 
policy on multiple fronts.  These critiques of best mode can be 
broken down into three categories: (1) failure to achieve its purpose, 
(2) litigation costs, and (3) international harmonization.  Each will 
be discussed in turn. 
The first critique of best mode is that the way the rule is written 
and has been interpreted does not necessarily achieve the ends it 
seeks to accomplish.  As described earlier, one purpose of best mode 
is to ensure that the public is put on a level playing field with the 
 
55 See Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585, 589 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
56 Id. 
57 See Solomson, supra note 52, at 387. 
58 Melissa N. McDonough, Note, To Agree, or Not to Agree: That is the Question When 
Evaluating the Best Mode Preferences of Joint Inventors After Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 80 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 151, 158 (2006). 
59  McDonough, supra note 58, at 158; see Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 
1316–20 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (describing instances when the best mode has been lacking despite a 
claim not existing to that element); see generally Solomson, supra note 52, at 387–420 
(explaining the different approaches used by the Federal Circuit and CCPA and how they do 
not set forth a consistent standard for analyzing the scope of best mode). 
60 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010). 
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patentee upon expiration of the patent.61  Yet the best mode does 
not necessarily reach that goal for a variety of reasons.  As 
discussed, best mode is subjective—only the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor needs to be divulged.62  Therefore, 
even if the inventor complies and discloses the best mode known to 
the inventor, this does not necessarily mean that the best mode, in 
an objective sense, will be revealed to the public.63  Similarly, 
because knowledge cannot be imputed from the inventor‘s 
employer,64 this limits the assurance that the best mode will in fact 
be disclosed.65  Likewise, because best mode only requires the best 
mode to be disclosed if the inventor has a best mode in mind, if an 
inventor is ambivalent towards multiple modes, then no best mode 
needs to be disclosed.66 
Another reason best mode does not necessarily achieve its goal of 
putting the public on a level playing field is that changes in 
technology may result in an outdated best mode before the end of 
the patent term.67  This is especially true in industries such as 
computer software and hardware where technology advances so 
quickly that even if the inventor disclosed the best mode at the time 
the application was filed it is quite likely, if not inevitable, that by 
the time the patent expires the technology will have changed 
dramatically and rendered the disclosed best mode a relic.68 
The second critique of best mode is that it drives up the costs of 
litigation while failing to provide a commensurate benefit.  In 1992, 
the Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform published a report 
to the Secretary of Commerce, which proposed eliminating best 
mode.69  The committee laudably noted the goals of best mode, but 
expressed doubt as to whether best mode achieves these goals and 
whether the costs of best mode outweigh the benefit it actually 
 
61 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
62 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010). 
63 THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PATENT LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF 
COMMERCE 102 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 REPORT]; see also McDonough, supra note 58, at 177 
(arguing that the best mode requirement is subjectively based on the inventor‘s opinion on 
what is the best mode). 
64 Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
65 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY 121 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter NRC REPORT]. 
66 McDonough, supra note 58, at 177; see also 3 CHISUM, supra note 26, § 7.05[1][c][i][B] 
(―[Courts] find no violation if there is no evidence that the inventor subjectively preferred any 
one of several possible implementations of the invention.‖). 
67 See 1992 REPORT, supra note 63, at 102; McDonough, supra note 58, at 179. 
68 1992 REPORT, supra note 63, at 102. 
69 Id. at 102. 
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provides.70  One such cost of best mode the committee noted was the 
cost of discovery in trying to uncover the subjective beliefs of the 
inventor.71  In 2004, the National Research Council (―NRC‖), as part 
of the National Academies, published a report recommending 
changes to the patent system.72  Echoing the recommendation of the 
1992 Advisory Commission report, one recommendation made by 
the NRC was the elimination of best mode.73  The report noted that 
one factor which increased the costs of patent litigation (via 
expensive pretrial discovery) was the existence of legal issues which 
depend on a party‘s state of mind.74  These additional costs, the 
NRC opined, were not outweighed by the benefits provided by 
applicants complying with the best mode, especially in light of the 
enablement requirement which already obligated the inventor to 
disclose how to make and use the invention (albeit not necessarily 
the best mode of making and using the invention).75 
The final critique of best mode deals with international 
harmonization.  The NRC report notes that best mode is unique to 
the United States.76  Because of this, it is thought to be unfair to 
foreign applicants who file for a patent in their home countries 
where best mode is not required and who then must amend their 
U.S. patent application to comply with an additional requirement.77  
Moreover, foreign inventors may be prejudiced by best mode in that 
it may restrict their ability to claim priority using their previously 
filed foreign application.78  To establish priority rights under a 
previously filed foreign application the applicant must have fully 
complied with the U.S. disclosure provisions, including best mode.79  
A failure to do so results in a later effective filing date, which could 
result in the loss of U.S. patent rights that, but for the failure to 
 
70 See id. at 101. 
71 Id. 
72 NRC REPORT, supra note 65. 
73 Id. at 121. 
74 Id. at 117. 
75 Id. at 120–21.  Later, the NRC noted that between willful infringement, inequitable 
conduct, and best mode as the upward drivers of litigation costs, ―[b]est mode ranked a 
distant third.‖  Id. at 123. 
76 Id. at 121; but see Dale L. Carlson et al., Patent Linchpin for the 21st Century?—Best 
Mode Revisited, 45 IDEA 267, 283–84 (2005) (listing countries beyond the United States that 
require a best mode disclosure). 
77 NRC REPORT, supra note 65, at 121. 
78 See Donald S. Chisum, Best Mode Concealment and Inequitable Conduct in Patent 
Procurement: A Nutshell, a Review of Recent Federal Circuit Cases and a Plea for Modest 
Reform, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 277, 282 (1997). 
79 Id. 
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disclose the best mode, would have been granted.80 
To be sure, best mode supporters have challenged each of these 
critiques.81  Nonetheless, the critics prevailed (at least partially) 
and persuaded Congress to change best mode as a result of patent 
reform. 
III.  THE AIA‘S CHANGES TO BEST MODE 
Underlying the AIA is six years of patent reform history, which 
played a fundamental role in shaping the AIA‘s best mode 
amendments.  In 2005, the House of Representatives proposed a bill 
that would have eliminated best mode.82  This bill was referred to 
the Judiciary Committee, but never made it out of committee.83  The 
next year the Senate proposed its own reforms, which made no 
modifications to best mode.84  As with the House bill from the 
previous year, the Senate bill was referred to the Judiciary 
Committee, but never made it out.85 
In 2007, the House proposed another patent reform bill, but this 
time the bill kept best mode a requirement for patentability while 
removing it as a defense in litigation and cancellation of claims.86  
The House Judiciary Committee Report reflected concerns that best 
mode was unique to the United States, inherently subjective, and 
often technologically irrelevant.87  This bill was passed by the 
House, but was never voted on by the Senate.88  The Senate also 
 
80 See McDonough, supra note 58, at 176. 
81 See generally Carlson, supra note 76, at 273–283 (identifying several criticisms of best 
mode and addressing each in turn); Selinger, supra note 4 (defending best mode against 
critiques specifically made within the 1990 Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform); see 
generally Wesley D. Markham, Is Best Mode the Worst? Dueling Arguments, Empirical 
Analysis, and Recommendations for Reform, 51 IDEA 129 (2011) (evaluating the arguments 
for and against best mode). 
82 Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 4(d) (2005); Markham, supra note 
81, at 157. 
83 See H.R. 2795: Patent Act of 2005, GOVTRACK.US,  http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bill.xpd?bill=h109-2795 (last visited Dec. 30, 2011). 
84 See Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006); Markham, supra note 81, at 
157. 
85 See S. 3818: Patent Reform Act of 2006, GOVTRACK.US,  http://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-3818 (last visited Dec. 30, 2011). 
86 Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. §§ 6(f)(1), 13 (2007); Markham, 
supra note 81, at 157. 
87 See H.R. REP. NO. 110-314, at 43–44 (2007); Markham, supra note 81, at 157–58.  A best 
mode could be technologically irrelevant because ―best mode applies only to what the inventor 
knew at the time of filing, not modes of practice that may be created or refined thereafter.  
Accordingly, by the time of patent litigation, the best mode may already be obsolete.‖  H.R. 
REP. NO. 110-314, at 44 (2007). 
88 See H.R. 1908: Patent Reform Act of 2007, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/ 
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introduced a patent reform bill in 2007, which again was silent on 
best mode.89  Yet as discussion and debate on the Senate bill moved 
forward, members of the Judiciary Committee noted in a press 
release that they were working with interested parties to develop a 
workable solution to best mode.90  Pressures by competing interests 
groups had caused Congress to give serious considerations to best 
mode.91  Nonetheless, this Senate bill was never voted on by the 
Senate.92 
In 2009, the Senate introduced patent reform legislation with a 
compromised best mode requirement—required for obtaining a 
patent, but not a defense in litigation or a basis for cancellation.93  
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report was nearly identical to the 
report accompanying the AIA in that it cited the same critiques of 
best mode while recognizing the importance of disclosure to the 
patent system.94  Despite the Senate coming around to the proposal 
originally made by the House in 2007, the House‘s 2009 patent 
reform bill did not eliminate best mode as a defense in litigation.95  
The Senate bill was never voted on by the Senate96 and the House 
bill was referred to committee but never made it out.97 
Finally, after several years of attempted compromise, patent 
reform measures were agreed to and the AIA was passed.  The 
change to best mode is found in section 15 of the AIA.  This section 
provides: 
 (a) In General.—Section 282 of title 35, United States 
Code, is amended in the second undesignated paragraph by 
striking paragraph (3) and inserting the following: 
―(3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for 
failure to comply with— 
 
congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1908 (last visited Dec. 30, 2011). 
89 See Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007); Markham, supra note 81, at 
158. 
90 Markham, supra note 81, at 158–59. 
91 See generally id. at 133–35 (noting the split of opinion on best mode between brand 
name and generic pharmaceutical companies). 
92 See S. 1145: Patent Reform Act of 2007, GOVTRACK.US,  http://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-1145 (last visited Dec. 30, 2011). 
93 Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. §§ 5(f), 14 (2009); Markham, supra note 
81, at 159. 
94 S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 24–25 (2009); Markham, supra note 81, at 159. 
95 Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 6(h) (2009); Markham, supra note 
81, at 160. 
96 See S. 515: Patent Reform Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bill.xpd?bill=s111-515 (last visited Dec. 30, 2011). 
97 See H.R. 1260: Patent Reform Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-1260 (last visited Dec. 30, 2011). 
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―(A) any requirement of section 112, except that the 
failure to disclose the best mode shall not be a basis 
on which any claim of a patent may be canceled or 
held invalid or otherwise unenforceable; or 
―(B) any requirement of section 251.‖. 
 (b) Conforming Amendment.—Sections 119(e)(1) and 120 
of title 35, United States Code, are each amended by striking 
―the first paragraph of section 112 of this title‖ and inserting 
―section 112(a) (other than the requirement to disclose the 
best mode)‖. 
 (c) Effective Date.—The amendments made by this section 
shall take effect upon the date of the enactment of this Act 
and shall apply to proceedings commenced on or after that 
date.98 
In short, as of September 16, 2011, section 15 eliminated best 
mode as a basis for asserting invalidity, inequitable conduct, or 
cancellation of any or all claims in a patent while at the same time 
leaving best mode in section 112 untouched.99  As a result, patent 
applicants must disclose the best mode to receive a patent, but in 
the event a patent is obtained despite a failure to comply with 
section 112‘s best mode requirement no challenge to the patent 
rights can be made based on this failure.100 
The legislative history of the AIA‘s best mode amendment is 
relatively sparse, but builds upon the years of unsuccessful 
attempts at patent reform discussed earlier.101  The House Judiciary 
Committee Report indicates that the elimination of best mode as a 
defense to patent infringement was decided based on best mode 
being unique to the United States, inherently subjective, and often 
technologically irrelevant.102  Thus, Congress bought into the 
 
98 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 15, 125 Stat. 284, 328 (2011). 
99 Compare Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 15, 125 Stat. 284, 328 
(2011) (eliminating best mode as a basis for asserting invalidity), with 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010) 
(―The specification . . . shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor . . . .‖). 
100 Paragraph (b) of section 15 makes two conforming amendments to sections 119 and 120 
of the Patent Act.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 15, 125 Stat. 284, 
328 (2011).  The change to section 119 eliminates compliance with the best mode for purposes 
of priority with a provisional application.  Id.  The change to section 120 eliminates best mode 
as a requirement for priority in continuing applications.  Id. 
101 See supra notes 82–97 and accompanying text. 
102 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 112TH CONG., REP. ON THE AMERICA INVENTS 
ACT 52 (Comm. Print 2011).  For support, the committee report cites to arguments made by 
the National Academy of Sciences, the Biotechnology Industry Organization, the American 
Intellectual Property Law Association, the Intellectual Property Owners Association, and 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America.  Id. at 53 n.54.  With respect to 
technological irrelevance, the report states that ―the best mode contemplated at the time of 
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arguments made by best mode critics, but compromised and refused 
to go as far as many requested103 because Congress also recognized 
that the required disclosures, including best mode, are an 
―important tradeoff that underlies the patent laws: the grant of a 
limited-term monopoly in exchange for disclosure of the 
invention.‖104 
Before passage of the AIA, a patent applicant could file a patent 
application, conceal the best mode, and if the PTO caught the error, 
then the application could be rejected.105  If the PTO failed to catch 
the concealment, then the risk of having the claims declared invalid 
or unenforceable during litigation remained.106 
With the AIA‘s amendment to best mode, a patent applicant who 
conceals the best mode runs the same risk of the PTO catching the 
error and rejecting the application.107  But if the applicant 
successfully avoids having this error caught by the PTO, the 
applicant no longer faces the looming risks of invalidity or 
unenforceability.108  As a result, there may now be an incentive to 
actively conceal the best mode as long as the risks of PTO detection 
are sufficiently low. 
IV.  BEST MODE AT THE PTO 
The risk of detection by the PTO of a best mode omission is a key 
component in determining whether applicants will voluntarily 
 
invention may not be the best mode for practicing or using the invention years later.‖  Id. at 
52.  Of course, as is clear from section 112‘s language, the relevant time period for best mode 
is not the time of invention, but rather the time the patent application is filed.  Id.; 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112 (2010). 
103 See 1992 REPORT, supra note 63, at 100–01 (urging elimination of best mode); NRC 
REPORT, supra note 65, at 121 (urging same). 
104 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 112TH CONG., REP. ON THE AMERICA INVESTS 
ACT 52 (Comm. Print 2011). 
105 See id. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. (explaining that the best mode requirement is retained for patent prosecution 
and eliminated only as a defense to invalidity). 
108 One could argue that inequitable conduct based on a failure to disclose the best mode to 
the PTO is still a viable defense in litigation.  The argument is that section 15 of the AIA only 
prohibits failure to disclose the best mode to be a basis for invalidity or unenforceability and 
that a defendant is not asserting failure to disclose the best mode as the direct basis; instead, 
the defendant is asserting inequitable conduct before the PTO as the direct basis.  Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 15, 125 Stat. 284, 328 (2011).  This 
argument is unlikely to prevail.  First, section 15 does not draw a distinction between failure 
to disclose the best mode as a direct basis and as an indirect basis.  See id.  Second, Congress 
was aware that best mode violations were frequently styled as inequitable conduct claims and 
this likely serves as the reason why section 15 prohibits not just invalidity based on best 
mode violations, but also unenforceability—the result of a finding of inequitable conduct.   
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comply with section 112‘s best mode requirement.  But the risk of 
rejection at the PTO for failure to disclose the best mode is almost 
nonexistent.109 
The difficulty of detection at the PTO is the subjective prong of 
the two-part best mode test.110  Rarely is there evidence before the 
patent examiner that would permit the examiner to conclude that 
the inventor, at the time of filing the application, actually knew of a 
better mode of practicing the claimed invention.111  In fact, the 
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (―MPEP‖) tells examiners 
that they ―should assume that the best mode is disclosed in the 
application, unless evidence is presented that is inconsistent with 
that assumption‖112 and notes that ―[i]t is extremely rare that a best 
mode rejection properly would be made in ex parte prosecution.‖113 
This presumption of compliance with the best mode is not to say 
that a rejection for failure to disclose the best mode is impossible.114  
In theory, this type of evidence could be discovered during 
prosecution while making an argument to the examiner about the 
underlying technology or in reference to an office action concerning 
another requirement of patentability.115 
However, a recent study reviewed published decisions of the 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (―BPAI‖) from 1981 
through 2009.116  The author found only six BPAI decisions 
involving an examiner rejecting claims because of a failure to satisfy 
the best mode.117  Of those six cases, the BPAI reversed the 
examiner‘s best mode rejection in five cases and did not reach the 
issue in the sixth case.118  Of course, the limitation of this study is 
 
109 Matthew J. Dowd et al., Nanotechnology and the Best Mode, 2 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & 
BUS. 238, 249 (2005) (―The PTO rarely issues a rejection for failure to comply with the best 
mode.‖). 
110 Id. at 244–45 (―[A]scertaining the best mode or even the existence of a best mode, poses 
difficulties—especially years later.‖). 
111 U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2165.03 (8th ed., 8th rev. 2010) (―The information that is necessary 
to form the basis for a rejection based on the failure to set forth the best mode is rarely 
accessible . . . .‖). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. (―The information that is necessary to form the basis for a rejection . . . is generally 
uncovered during discovery procedures in . . . inter partes proceedings.‖). 
115 Steven B. Walmsley, Best Mode: A Plea to Repair or Sacrifice This Broken Requirement 
of United States Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 125, 158 (2002) (―Such 
evidence . . . might emerge during prosecution of the application, perhaps in a technical 
argument to the examiner . . . .‖). 
116 Markham, supra note 81, at 152. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
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that not every rejection by an examiner is appealed to the BPAI.119  
Nonetheless, given the presumption of compliance with the best 
mode in the MPEP120 and the infrequent number of appeals relating 
to best mode it is not a large leap of faith to presume that the risk of 
detection at the PTO for failure to disclose the best mode is, for all 
intents and purposes, nonexistent. 
V.  EXTINCTION OR INNOVATIVE ENFORCEMENT? 
Given that enforcement of best mode is now off the table for 
purposes of invalidity, unenforceability, and cancellation and there 
is essentially no risk of detection at the PTO for failure to disclose 
the best mode, the obvious question is: What is best mode‘s fate?  
We are at a fork in the road of best mode‘s journey.  One path leads 
to the complete elimination of best mode; the other leads to 
innovative means of enforcement. 
A.  Complete Elimination of the Best Mode 
Presumably Congress realized that the PTO had effectively 
abandoned best mode during examination and that the AIA‘s best 
mode amendments would leave this requirement without any 
teeth.121  Given the several years of back and forth proposals 
between the House and Senate about whether to completely 
eliminate best mode or remove the commonly used enforcement 
mechanisms, it could be that the AIA was simply the first step in a 
two-step reform. 
The second step in this process is to completely eliminate best 
mode as a requirement for patentability.  Giving the stakeholders 
an opportunity to digest the changes made by the AIA may make 
eventual elimination easier to accept down the road. 
Of course—knowing that the PTO does not actually enforce best 
mode—it seems odd that best mode proponents would have been 
satisfied with the AIA‘s compromise.  There are other points along 
the spectrum of best mode reform that would perhaps have been 
 
119 Id. (acknowledging the study‘s limitation to appellate data because the PTO does not 
specifically track best mode rejections by examiners).  
120 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 111, § 2165.03. 
121 See A. Christal Sheppard, Because Inquiring Minds Want to Know—Best Mode—Why is 
it One-Sided?, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/ 
2011/09/guest-post-because-inquiring-minds-want-to-know-best-mode-why-is-it-one-sided-
.html (―This result was absolutely contemplated by the decision makers.‖). 
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more palatable to best mode supporters.122  Under this 
interpretation, advocates of eliminating best mode have achieved—
as a practical matter—what they set out to accomplish, while letting 
best mode supporters preserve best mode as a mere keepsake. 
B.  Innovative Enforcement 
Congress‘s piecemeal elimination of best mode is an unsatisfying 
explanation.  If Congress really intended to abolish best mode, then 
it easily could have done so, especially given how close the AIA 
comes to this.  Another possible interpretation of what Congress 
was doing in the AIA is that it was sending a signal to the PTO to 
be more diligent about examining the best mode in patent 
applications.  To do so, the PTO will need to create new methods of 
enforcement or use existing tools that have been underutilized. 
1.  The Basis—Rule 1.105 
One tool the PTO could employ to enforce best mode is to use 
Requirements for Information (―RFIs‖) under Rule 1.105.123  Rule 
1.105 provides, in relevant part, that in the course of examining an 
application, the examiner may require the applicant, patent 
attorney or agent, and associates to submit ―such information as 
may be reasonably necessary to properly examine or treat the 
matter.‖124 
The bounds of the RFIs have been liberally construed by the 
Federal Circuit.125  In Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., the Federal Circuit 
held an RFI sent to an applicant seeking ―any information available 
regarding the sale or other public distribution of the claimed plant 
variety anywhere in the world‖ was proper.126  The applicant 
refused to provide the information because it believed the 
information requested ―was ‗not material to the patentability of the 
[plant] variety.‘‖127  As a result, the application was deemed 
abandoned and the applicant brought suit alleging that the director 
of the PTO abused his discretion in denying the applicant‘s 
 
122 For example, best mode reform could have: (1) eliminated it for invalidity, but not 
inequitable conduct; (2) allowed best mode to be used in cancellations; (3) required applicants 
to update the best mode before the patent issued; or (4) required patentees to update the best 
mode upon renewal. 
123 37 C.F.R. § 1.105 (2011). 
124 Id. § 1.105(a)(1). 
125 See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281–83 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
126 Id. at 1280. 
127 Id. 
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challenge to the RFI.128  The Federal Circuit rejected the applicant‘s 
argument and held that the PTO can request information under 
Rule 1.105 ―that does not directly support a rejection.‖129  In fact, 
the court continued in its explanation of the scope of RFIs and 
stated ―that ‗such information as may be reasonably necessary to 
properly examine or treat the matter,‘‖ as specified in Rule 1.105 
―contemplates information relevant to examination either 
procedurally or substantively.  It includes a zone of information 
beyond that defined by section 1.56 as material to patentability, and 
beyond that which is directly useful to support a rejection or 
conclusively decide the issue of patentability.‖130  Thus, Star Fruits 
gives the PTO wide authority to inquire into areas that otherwise 
might appear to be tangential to patentability. 
Armed with this broad authority, the PTO could, as a standard 
practice, request an applicant or patent attorney (or agent) to 
indicate whether the inventor had a best mode, and if so, to point 
out what particular language in the specification discloses it.  
Although this runs counter to the decisions in cases holding that the 
applicant need not specifically identify the best mode,131 this type of 
RFI would not necessarily run afoul of the PTO‘s power under 1.105 
because this information could be useful in concluding that the 
objective prong of the best mode test was satisfied. 
Perhaps knowing that the PTO will specifically inquire into best 
mode via an RFI will alleviate the problem of applicants failing to 
disclose the best mode.  If applicants, their patent attorneys, or 
agents know that they will be asked about whether best mode has 
been complied with, then they may be more willing to initially 
disclose because of the possible sanctions for failing to disclose, 
which are discussed in the following sections.132 
Also, in theory, with this additional information provided to the 
PTO, the examiner could engage in a more thorough best mode 
analysis (i.e. determining whether the disclosed best mode satisfies 
the objective prong of the test).  Of course, for the dishonest 
applicant, patent attorney, or agent, this latter result is most 
certainly unlikely to occur.  For them, the means of enforcement 
described below could apply. 
 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 1281–82. 
130 Id. at 1282. 
131 See, e.g., Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585, 589 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
132 See infra Parts V.B.2 and V.B.3. 
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2.  Criminal Means 
One method of enforcing best mode could be through the federal 
False Statements Statute (―FSS‖).  The FSS provides, in relevant 
part: 
[W]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the 
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government 
of the United States, knowingly and willfully . . . makes any 
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 
representation . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned 
not more than 5 years . . . or both.133 
If the patent examiner submits an RFI to the patent applicant 
requesting that the applicant indicate whether he or she has a best 
mode, and if so, to particularly point out where in the specification 
it is, then falsely stating that no best mode exists or that the 
referenced language in the specification is the best mode would 
constitute a violation of the FSS.  The response to the RFI would 
constitute a false statement. 
Materiality is determined by whether the statement is capable of 
influencing or affecting a federal agency.134  The false statement 
about the best mode or lack thereof would be material in that 
disclosure of the best mode is still a requirement for patentability 
under section 112 and a false statement to avoid making a required 
disclosure would certainly be capable of influencing or affecting the 
PTO‘s decision to grant or reject a patent application. 
The knowledge requirement for a violation of the FSS ―relates 
only to the defendant‘s knowledge and intent that the statements 
[the defendant] made to a government entity were false or were 
made with the conscious purpose of evading the truth.‖135 
With respect to best mode disclosures, an applicant who falsely 
responded to an RFI, indicating that the applicant did not know of a 
best mode while in fact having one or by pointing out inferior modes 
in the specification would, by definition, demonstrate knowledge 
that the statement was false.  This is in contrast to the scenario in 
which the applicant files the patent application and simply fails to 
disclose the best mode or to specifically point out where in the 
specification it lies.  In that case, the applicant would be in a better 
 
133 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2010). 
134 See, e.g., United States v. Serv. Deli Inc., 151 F.3d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing 
what constitutes materiality); United States v. Puente, 982 F.2d 156, 159 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(discussing same); U.S. v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1415 (10th Cir. 1991) (discussing same). 
135 U.S. v. Lupton, 620 F.3d 790, 806 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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position to assert that the applicant did not make a false statement 
at all or that the application itself, even if a statement, was not 
made with a conscious purpose of evading the truth because the 
applicant was simply complying with existing patent law.136 
The final requirement for a violation of the FSS requires that the 
statement be made in any matter within the jurisdiction of the 
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the U.S. government.137  
This jurisdictional requirement is satisfied when the federal agency 
―has the power to exercise authority in a particular situation,‖ as 
opposed to ―‗matters peripheral to the business of that body.‘‖138  
The PTO is certainly an executive branch agency139 and 
undoubtedly the PTO has the power to exercise authority to grant 
patents.140 
In sum, if the PTO were to use RFIs to inquire into the best mode, 
then this would provide a foundation for referring criminal 
prosecutions to the Department of Justice.  There are, of course, 
limitations to this method of enforcement,141 but even the threat of 
criminal prosecution may help chill failures to disclose the best 
mode. 
3.  Ethical Means 
In addition to criminal prosecutions under the FSS, enforcement 
of best mode concealments might be done via disciplinary action 
against the applicant‘s patent attorney or agent.  In short, this 
technique would shift the risk from the applicant to the patent 
attorney or agent and force that individual to risk his or her license 
to practice before the PTO or, in the case of patent attorneys, to 
practice law generally.  Presumably, most patent attorneys or 
agents would be unwilling to take this risk on behalf of their clients‘ 
abilities to keep the best mode a secret. 
Patent Office Rule 1.56 states that ―[e]ach individual associated 
with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of 
candor and good faith.‖142  This duty requires the individual to 
 
136 See Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585, 589 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (failing to 
specifically point out which mode is the best is not a violation of section 112). 
137 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2010). 
138 U.S. v. Davis, 8 F.3d 923, 929 (2nd Cir. 1993) (quoting U.S. v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 
479 (1984)). 
139 Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
1965, 1973-74 (2009). 
140 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2010). 
141 See infra Part V.B.4. 
142 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2011). 
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disclose to the PTO all information known to that individual to be 
material to patentability.143  Failure to do so constitutes a violation 
of the patent attorney‘s or patent agent‘s ethical duty not to ―engage 
in disreputable or gross misconduct,‖ ―conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,‖ or ―conduct that is prejudicial 
to the administration of justice.‖144 
A violation of the duty of candor under Rule 1.56, like with a 
violation of the FSS, may result if a patent attorney or patent agent 
knows the applicant has a best mode, but fails to disclose it or fails 
to specifically designate it in response to an RFI.145  This violation 
may subject the patent attorney or patent agent to discipline before 
the Office of Enrollment and Discipline.146 
Beyond the duty of candor in Rule 1.56, other PTO rules could be 
used by the PTO in an attempt to enforce best mode disclosures.  
For example, Rule 10.85 prohibits patent attorneys and agents from 
―[k]nowingly making a false statement of law or fact‖147 or 
counseling or assisting a client in conduct known to be 
fraudulent.148  Moreover, patent attorneys and agents have a duty 
to promptly call upon the client to rectify a fraud perpetrated upon 
the PTO and if the client fails to do so, then to reveal the fraud to 
the PTO, in the event the attorney or agent receives information 
clearly establishing such fraudulent conduct.149  These PTO 
disciplinary rules also have similar counterparts under the state 
disciplinary rules, which would be relevant if the PTO were to refer 
a matter to the relevant jurisdiction.150 
If the PTO were to use RFIs as described above,151 this would 
force patent attorneys and agents to consult with their clients and 
 
143 Id. 
144 Id. §§ 10.23(a), (b)(4)–(5). 
145 See Tamsen Valoir & David Hricik, Patents and Trademarks: The Duty of Good Faith, 
89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 287, 292 (2007). 
146 See id. at 293; 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.20(b), 10.23(a), (c)(10) (2011). 
147 37 C.F.R. § 10.85(a)(5) (2011). 
148 Id. § 10.85(a)(7). 
149 Id. § 10.85(b)(1). 
150 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2011) (prohibiting false statements 
of material fact); id. R. 3.3(a)(3) (prohibiting an attorney from offering evidence known to be 
false); id. R. 3.3(b) (requiring an attorney who knows the client is engaging or has engaged in 
fraudulent conduct in an adjudicative proceeding to take reasonable remedies, including 
disclosure if necessary); id. R. 3.3(d) (―[A] lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts 
known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or 
not the facts are adverse.‖); see also id. R. 1.13(a)–(b) (requiring attorneys representing 
organizations to report to a higher authority any conduct that could result in a violation of a 
legal obligation or that could result in substantial injury to the organization). 
151 See supra Part V.B.1. 
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attempt to force them to confront the best mode issue specifically or 
at least make it more difficult to bury their heads in the sand.  And 
similar to enforcement in the criminal context, if the PTO were to 
use RFIs to inquire into best mode, then this would provide a 
foundation for disciplining patent attorneys and agents who knew 
about the applicant‘s attempts to conceal the best mode and 
conspired with them or failed to take corrective action.  As with the 
criminal prosecution method of enforcement, there are, of course, 
limitations to this method,152 but the threat of disciplinary action 
against patent attorneys or agents may help reduce concealment of 
the best mode. 
4.  Limitations 
Despite the potential for the PTO to use RFIs in conjunction with 
criminal and ethical techniques to enforce best mode, there are 
several limitations to these techniques, which render them 
ineffective or otherwise unwise options for enforcement. 
The first limitation on both the criminal and ethical methods of 
enforcement is the difficulty of discovering evidence of a violation.  
Under the FSS, knowledge of the false statement is a necessary 
element.153  Under the disciplinary rules, the attorney‘s or agent‘s 
knowledge about the applicant‘s knowledge is required.154  Before 
the AIA, discovery of best mode violations were uncovered in the 
pretrial discovery process during litigation, as defendants would 
seek to invalidate claims for failure to disclose the best mode.155 
Upon passage of the AIA, failure to disclose the best mode is no 
longer a basis to assert invalidity or unenforceability.156  As a result, 
a defendant‘s ability to seek information related to the best mode is 
severely hampered.  Given that one of the purposes of the AIA was 
to reduce the costs of litigation, it seems entirely possible that a 
patentee could successfully object to discovery requests relating to 
best mode and obtain a protective order limiting discovery.157  
Therefore, the likelihood of the PTO, its Office of Enrollment and 
Discipline, the DOJ, or a state disciplinary board being made aware 
of the violation is quite low.158 
 
152 See infra Part V.B.4. 
153 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
154 See supra notes 143–49 and accompanying text. 
155 See NRC REPORT, supra note 65, at 121. 
156 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 15, 125 Stat. 284, 328 (2011). 
157 See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 40 (2011). 
158 It would not be impossible to discover this information.  Discovery of best mode 
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The second limitation to the criminal and ethical methods of 
enforcement is the statutes of limitation.  Prosecution for a violation 
of the FSS must commence within five years after the offense has 
been committed.159  Therefore, even if evidence were uncovered to 
show that the applicant, patent attorney, or agent had knowingly 
made a materially false statement regarding best mode, it very well 
might be too late to be useful.  Moreover, an argument to toll the 
statute of limitations until discovery of the false statement will not 
succeed.  In U.S. v. Dunne, the Tenth Circuit rejected such an 
argument by the government and held that ―[t]he ability of the 
government . . . to learn of a particular offense is not a relevant 
factor.‖160 
The statute of limitations for the ethical method of enforcement is 
less problematic, but still poses a problem.  The AIA amends the 
limitations period so that any disciplinary actions must be brought 
before the earlier of ten years from the date of the misconduct or 
one year after the date the misconduct is made known to the 
PTO.161  Although the limitations period is longer for disciplinary 
actions and contains a discovery rule provision, the discovery rule 
provision is capped at ten years after the misconduct.162  As a result, 
unless discovery of evidence of a best mode concealment takes place 
relatively quickly, the applicable statutes of limitation will severely 
limit the criminal and ethical methods of enforcement. 
The third limitation relates to ethical enforcement.  The threat of 
disciplinary sanctions from the PTO‘s Office of Enrollment and 
Discipline or state disciplinary commission is limited to lawyers 
(and patent agents in the case of the PTO) who know of their client‘s 
false statement in response to the RFIs.163  For those attorneys who 
legitimately have no knowledge of the applicant‘s belief about the 
best mode or those who strategically position themselves to avoid 
such knowledge the threat of disciplinary action is ineffective at 
 
violations could be found in connection with a claim for a Walker Process violation of the 
antitrust laws or through inadvertent disclosure in connection with legitimate discovery on 
another issue of patentability or claim interpretation.  See generally Walker Process Equip., 
Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). 
159 See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2010); United States v. Smith, 740 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 
1984). 
160 United States v. Dunne, 324 F.3d 1158, 1165 (10th Cir. 2003). 
161 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(a)(6) 125 Stat. 284, 291 
(2011).  Previously, ethical violations before the PTO was subject to the five-year statute of 
limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2462.  See Scheinbein v. Dudas, 465 F.3d 493, 496 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
162  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(a)(6) 125 Stat. 284, 291 
(2011). 
163 See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text. 
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forcing the best mode to be disclosed.164 
The fourth limitation is the chilling effect that the threat of 
enforcement may have on legitimate conduct.  This limitation 
applies to both methods of enforcement.  The heart of enforcement 
by criminal prosecution or ethical disciplinary action lies with the 
power of these sanctions to chill criminal or unethical conduct and 
cause actors to err on the side of disclosing rather than concealing.  
And although it may be that some less desirable behavior will be 
chilled by these threats of enforcement, these threats may also tend 
to chill legitimate conduct.  Over-enforcement or even the threat of 
criminal prosecution or ethical disciplinary action could result in 
fewer applications (and consequently less disclosure).  Depending on 
the balance struck, these enforcement measures could undermine 
the very purpose of the patent system—disclosure to promote the 
progress of the useful arts.165 
Finally, although not really a limitation on the criminal and 
ethical methods of enforcement, is the point that even in the 
absence of any enforcement mechanism many applicants may still 
disclose the best mode.166  For example, although prior user rights 
have been strengthened under the AIA,167 an applicant may still 
want to disclose their best mode so it will serve as prior art to 
prevent a subsequent applicant from being able to obtain a patent 
claiming that mode.168  In addition, applicants may voluntarily 
disclose the best mode so they can attempt to narrow their claims in 
the event their broader claims are later invalidated. 
In sum, although there may be some attractive features of using 
criminal or ethical means to enforce best mode disclosures, the 
limitations of these means, the costs of implementing them, and the 
already existing incentives to disclose render both methods largely 
ineffective. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The erosion of best mode has been in the works for a number of 
 
164 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct state that knowledge may be inferred from 
the circumstances.  MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (2010) (defining ―knowingly,‖ 
―known,‖ and ―knows‖).   Knowledge inferred from the circumstances could, in theory, be used 
to prevent an attorney from avoiding discipline by strategically positioning themselves to 
avoid actual knowledge.  In reality, however, this is difficult to effectuate. 
165 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
166 Chisum, supra note 78, at 318 n.186. 
167 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(a)(6), 125 Stat. 284, 292 
(2011). 
168 See Chisum, supra note 78, at 318 n.186. 
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years.  The AIA has resulted in best mode remaining as a 
requirement for patentability, but has eliminated the commonly 
used means of enforcement—litigation to show invalidity or 
unenforceability.  Up until now, and for good reason, the PTO has 
failed to take on the responsibility of policing best mode disclosures. 
But by removing the invalidity, unenforceability, and cancellation 
arrows from the quiver of best mode enforcement while still keeping 
best mode as a requirement for patentability, Congress may have 
been attempting to shift the responsibility of enforcement to the 
PTO.  And although tools exist for the PTO to enforce best mode—
criminal and ethical means of enforcement—these are ineffective 
methods and will likely not result in additional best mode 
disclosures.  In fact, if these measures were adopted, a potential 
may exist for less disclosure than what would otherwise result. 
In the end, if Congress believes it made the right decision in the 
AIA concerning best mode, then Congress should simply bite the 
bullet and formally eliminate best mode as a requirement for 
patentability.  Of course it is difficult to jettison such a long-held 
requirement, but in the end, keeping the requirement without 
effective enforcement mechanisms does not make much sense. 
